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Dionysius of Halicarnassus On Imitation
MALCOLM HEATH (UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS) 
ABSTRACT: This paper defends Usener’s theory that the extract from Dionysius’ 
On Imitation in the Letter to Pompeius is from an unfinished draft of the text 
which lies behind the epitome of On Imitation. 
The survey of historians in Dionysius’ Letter to Gnaeus Pompeius purports to 
be a transcription of part of the second book of his treatise On Imitation. This 
treatise has otherwise been preserved only in a fragmentary epitome; but there are 
disrepancies between the two sources, especially in their handling of the 
pragmatikÕj tÒpoj, which suggest that the transcription in the Letter was not in 
fact made from the same original as the epitome. In 1889 Usener suggested that 
the Letter reproduced a draft, the epitome the published version of the treatise.1 
More recently K.S. Sacks has argued that the Letter does not attempt to reproduce 
but substantially reworks Imitation, and that this reworking reflects significant 
changes in Dionysius’ thinking on historiography.2 I shall argue that Usener was 
right.  
The first difference between the two sources is the most dramatic. The 
relevant section of the Letter begins with a comparison between Herodotus and 
Thucydides with respect to the pragmatikÕj tÒpoj that fills just over six pages in 
the Teubner edition of Usener and Radermacher (II 232.18-239.2); this 
corresponds to a single sentence in the epitome: ‘As for the historians, Herodotus 
has executed the pragmatikÕn edoj better’ (II 207.5-6). As Sacks sees (68), there 
are two possibilities; either the epitomator has cut out a large section of his 
original, or Dionysius did not include this comparison in the original from which 
the epitome was made. Since the comparison is found in the Letter, and Dionysius 
claims that the Letter reproduces Imitation (232.13-17), it is natural to infer that 
the epitomator was responsible for the omission.3 Sacks comments (68): ‘The 
lone sentence on the pragmatikon eidos comes directly after the passage in the 
comic poets, where pragmatikon there also receives mere mention and the lektikos 
topos greater development’; but we cannot possibly determine the relationship of 
the epitome to its original by comparing one part of the epitome with another in 
this way. Sacks offers no compelling argument against the natural inference.  
 
1 Dionysii Halicarnassensis de imitatione librorum reliquiae ab H. Usenero collectae (Bonn 
1889), 6: ‘Mutuam sibi opem et epistula et epitoma ferunt. quod si quando desunt in epistula quae 
librariorum neglegentia omitti minus est probabile, hoc tenendum erit, in epistula illud caput 
translatum esse ante quam totum opus perpolitum a scriptore emitteretur, epitomam non ex 
epistula sed ex opere perfecto excerptam.’  
[Additional note (December 2007): I would now wish to modify my conclusions on this question 
in the light of the important discussion in Gavin Weaire, ‘The relationship between Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus’ De imitatione and Epistula ad Pompeium’, Classical Philology 97 (2002), 351-9.] 
2 K.S. Sacks, ‘Historiography in the rhetorical works of Dionysius of Halicarnassus’, Athenaeum 
60 (1983), 65-87. 
3 An earlier section of the Letter is claimed to be transcribed from Dionysius’ work on Attic orators 
(226.22-227.1); comparison with Demosthenes shows that this is true: there are only slight verbal 
differences. 
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There are, in fact, a number of clear indications that the epitomator has 
omitted material from his original here. First, the epitome says that Herodotus 
handles the pragmatikÕj tÒpoj ‘better’. The comparative suggests a comparison, 
and in the ensuing discussion of the lektikÕj tÒpoj we find that a sÚgkrisij of 
Herodotus and Thucydides is indeed being conducted. But this is never formally 
inrtoduced; Thucydides is not even named in the sentence on the pragmatikÕj 
tÒpoj. So something has been left out. Secondly, the pragmatikÕj tÒpoj is 
treated in greater detail when the epitome reaches the minor historians; but it 
would have been odd of Dionysius in Imitation to pass over this topic when 
discussing the two major historians but to develop it for the minor historians. 
Furthermore, the treatment of this topic in the minor historians makes frequent 
reference to the major historians. In the discussion of Philistus the epitome refers 
to Thucydides’ treatment of the pragmatikÕj tÒpoj—to the incompleteness of 
his ØpÒqesij (208.17-19) and to his poor arrangement (208.19-209.1); this surely 
implies an original Imitation in which these points had already been established in 
a discussion of Thucydides. A similar conclusion is implied by the section on 
Xenophon in the epitome; here (208.3-5) the pragmatikÕj tÒpoj in Herodotus is 
recapitulated in greater detail than the epitome gives when it is concerned with 
Herodotus himself. These anomalies are easier to understand in notes taken for 
private use than in a formal treatise prepared for publication.  
External evidence supports the conclusion to which these pointers direct us. 
At the beginning of his Thucydides Dionysius says that in Imitation he indicated 
t…naj ›kastoj aÙtîn (sc., the historians) e„sfšrei pragmatik£j te kaˆ 
lektik¦j ¢ret£j. This claim is not true of the epitome, in which the 
pragmatika… ¢reta… of the two most important historians are neglected; so the 
epitome must have omitted some part of Imitation. Admittedly Dionysius says that 
his discussion in Imitation was ‘brief’ (™n Ñl…goij); and a few lines later he says 
specifically of his treatment of Thucydides that it was ‘concise and summary’ 
(suntÒmJ te kaˆ kefalaièdei grafÍ, cf. kefalaiwdîj in the epitome, 211.8). 
But even this is untrue of the epitome, although it is true of the Letter, which by 
comparison with Thucydides is concise and summary. The conclusion seems 
inescapable, therefore, that the sentence on the pragmatikÕn edoj in the epitome 
has replaced a more extensive discussion in the original Imitation, and that the 
original discussion was, like that in the Letter a sÚgkrisij. It is reasonable to 
infer, then, that the original discussion and that in the Letter were one and the 
same.  
Some further points arise in the discussion of the minor historians. Sacks says 
(68) that the Letter uses the standard five headings of the pragmatikÕj tÒpoj for 
Xenophon and Philistus, while Imitation (he should, of course, have said the 
epitome) only has three. These three are ØpÒqesij, o„konom…a and Ãqoj. Sacks is 
in doubt as to how to take o„konom…a, but he ought not to be. The Letter refers to 
ØpÒqesij, o„konom…a and Ãqoj, and subdivides o„konom…a into three subheadings 
(begining/ending, division and variety) to give five (241.15-19); the epitome has 
simply omitted the subdivision of o„konom…a, a condensation plausibly 
attributable to the epitomator.  
 2
MALCOLM HEATH, DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS ON IMITATION 
More interesting are the discrepancies which Sacks notes in the discussion of 
Philistus; these are the evidence on which he bases his claim that Dionysius has 
changed his mind. First, the epitome criticises Philistus for leaving his ØpÒqesij 
incomplete, like Thucydides; ‘in the Letter to Pompeius, however, it is when 
Dionysius discusses Xenophon’s subjects that he notes that the subject of 
Thucydides’ work is incomplete...; more importantly, Dionysius does so in a 
manner that implies no criticism’ (69). Secondly, the epitome criticises Philistus’ 
servile Ãqoj but admires Thucydides’ freedom; the Letter criticises Philistus in 
similar terms, though omitting the comparison with Thucydides, but elsewhere it 
is critical of Thucydides’ Ãqoj. These discrepancies are real, but neither affords 
evidence that Dionysius has changed his mind. First, an adverse judgement of 
Thucydides’ incompleteness is to be found in the Letter, in the sÚgkrisij of the 
major historians (236.1-5). Secondly, criticism of Thucydides’ anti-Athenian bias, 
such as we find in the Letter, is wholly consistent with praise of his freedom, such 
as we find in the epitome; both are to be found in Thucydides (cc. 8, 41; cf. Sacks 
69 n.18). It is quite possible that the adverse comment found in the Letter is 
absent from the epitome simply because the whole sÚgkrisij has been omitted. 
In neither case, therefore, is there any reason to conclude that Dionysius’ 
assessment of Thucydides has been revised. There is an important point here, even 
so. The omission of material from the Letter in the epitome is readily explained as 
the work of the epitomator; but the presence of additional material in the epitome 
is not.4 So the references to Thucydides’ incompleteness and to Thucydides’ Ãqoj 
in the epitome’s account of Philistus do point to a difference between its original 
and that of the Letter, as Usener saw.5 We shall return to this point.  
Sacks also points out (71) that the praise of Theopompus’ commitment to the 
profession of history in the Letter is missing in the epitome, and this he thinks 
‘certainly new’; but without the obviously circular assumption that the epitome 
accurately reflects the contents of the original Imitation his certainty is 
unwarranted. The Letter is also more expansive on Theopompus’ parrhs…a; 
Sacks comments: ‘Dionysius’ discussion here is clearly a revision of that found in 
Mimesis, for in the Letter the term parresia not used, nor does Dionysius discuss 
Theopompus’ talent for divining the motives of actions and speeches, but just 
those of actions.’ This has no force. The fact that the word parrhs…a does not 
occur in the Letter is irrelevant, since it is a reasonable summary of Dionysius’ 
defence of Theopompus’ critical stance towards historical characters, such as 
might easily have occurred to the epitomator. The addition of the words kaˆ 
lecqšntwn does not obviously go beyond the range of the epitomator’s 
rephrasing, but it may be a further instance of additional material in the epitome.  
We may now return to the question of the epitome’s additional material. We 
have seen that the epitome’s account of Philistus contains such additions; it is also 
                                                 
4 It is possible in principle that the epitomator made the additions himself; but to cut down the 
sÚgkrisij so radically implies a lack of interest in the pragmatikÕj tÒpoj, which makes 
additions elsewhere unlikely. 
5 See n.1 above. It is possible that the preceding discussion of Xenophon’s faults with respect to tÕ 
pršpon would have been relevant here; the lacuna at 242.10 makes this uncertain, but the remains 
of the Letter at this point are not easily reconciled with the epitome. 
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differently ordered. In the Letter Dionysius says: Philistus is like Thucydides in 
his choice of ØpÒqesij, his organisation and his lack of variety; and his Ãqoj is 
bad. The epitome: Philistus is like Thucydides, not in Ãqoj (he is servile, 
Thucydides is not), but in incompletness and bad organisation. No inferences can 
safely be drawn from the absence of material in the epitome that is found in the 
Letter (the choice of ØpÒqesij and the lack of variety) since it is possible that this 
is the result of epitomisation; but the additional material and the different order 
are significant. It is, I suggest, the order which points us to the correct solution. 
The order in which the points are made in the Letter is standard, and it is possible 
to misread the last point as a further similarity to Thucydides. The order in the 
epitome is unexpected, and the unwanted implication concerning Thucydides’ 
Ãqoj is explicitly removed. This does not suggest that the Letter is the more highly 
developed version of the material, as Sacks contends; rather, it supports Usener’s 
conjecture that the Letter is a version of the epitome’s source which had not 
received its final polish.  
In the Letter Dionysius says that the third book of Imitation is incomplete 
(232.12-13); it is a reasonable inference that Imitation was still being written 
when the extract from it was transcribed for Pompeius,6 and in that case the 
supposition that the epitome reflects a revision for publication of the version of 
Imitation transcribed in the Letter is perfectly plausible.  
                                                 
6 But this is not of course certain: S.F. Bonner, The Literary Treatises of Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus (Cambridge 1939), 36-7 points out that the first two books may have been issued 
separately, and that there is no evidence to confirm that that the third book was ever completed. 
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